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ERIE AS A WAY OF LIFE
Ernest A. Young*
I’m grateful for the opportunity to commemorate 80 years of Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. 1 Many of the papers in this conference explore
how Erie bears on particular areas of law, such as administrative law,
remedies, or intellectual property. I’d like to do something similar, but in
much more general terms. If we’re talking about the impact of Erie on
various aspects of the law, it’s appropriate to step back and think about
how Erie has shaped the legal landscape more generally.
I’m calling this talk “Erie as a Way of Life.” My thesis is that Erie
is absolutely central to modern American law in several broad respects,
ranging from the way we think about law jurisprudentially to the role of
the federal courts to the structure of the federal system. I do not say that
Erie necessarily caused the phenomena I describe here. In some respects,
the decision itself has driven important kinds of change. But in others,
Erie simply reflects broader developments in American law. Even in those
areas, Erie serves as a central exemplar of these institutional arrangements
and ways of thinking. As John Hart Ely said, “Erie is by no means simply
a case.” 2
As will be clear, I think Erie’s influence—and the principles that Erie
reflects—are generally salutary. But they are also under threat from a
whole range of other developments in American law and culture. One
distinguished Federal Courts scholar has even branded Erie “the worst

* Alston & Bird Professor, Duke Law School. This essay is a lightly-edited version of the keynote
address to the University of Akron School of Law’s conference on “Erie at 80.” I thank Tracy Thomas
and the University of Akron School of Law for inviting me and for their warm hospitality. My remarks
draw significantly upon my earlier work, A General Defense of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 10 J.
L. ECON. & POL’Y 17 (2013), although that piece’s argument has been considerably reformulated and
expanded for this symposium.
1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2. John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 695 (1974).
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decision of all time.” 3 My modest hope is that this essay, by identifying
the broad range of connections to Erie and the values that those
connections protect, can be a step toward preserving our Erie-grounded
way of life.
I. ERIE AND THE NATURE OF LAW
Let’s start with Erie and the nature of law itself. One of Justice
Brandeis’s most famous lines in Erie is actually a quote from Justice
Holmes:
“[L]aw in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist
without some definite authority behind it. The common law so far as it
is enforced in a State, whether called common law or not, is not the
common law generally but the law of that State existing by the authority
of that State without regard to what it may have been in England or
anywhere else.” 4

Prior to Erie, the federal courts had felt free to disagree with state courts
concerning the correct meaning of the general common law on questions
such as a railroad’s duty of care toward some poor schmuck walking along
the train track. Those decisions tended to suggest that there were general
right answers to such questions, deducible from general principles of law.
When the state courts got those questions wrong, the federal courts were
free to disregard the state courts’ answers and decide cases falling within
their own jurisdiction—typically on account of the parties’ diverse
citizenship—by their own best lights. Erie rejected this view of the matter.
The reason, as Brandeis explained, quoting Holmes, was that there
was no such thing as this “general” law. Rather, as Holmes said in another
dissent that Brandeis joined 20 years before, “[t]he common law is not a
brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some
sovereign or quasi sovereign that can be identified.” 5 This is the language
of legal positivism; it insists that law derives its authority not from its
logical truth (like the principles of mathematics) or consistency with
natural law or God’s law, but from some form of social acceptance—
typically endorsement by some sovereign governmental body. 6

3. Suzanna Sherry, Wrong, Out of Step, and Pernicious: Erie as the Worst Decision of All
Time, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 129 (2011).
4. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928)).
5. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
6. See, e.g., Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, Hard Positivism, and the Limits of Conceptual
Analysis, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT 355, 356 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001).
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It is true, as multiple Professors Green have argued, that a belief in
positivism alone could not make the Court’s pre-Erie practice
unconstitutional. 7 The Constitution does not itself mandate a particular
theory of law, positivist or otherwise. What positivism does, however, is
force the issue concerning what source of authority supports the legal rule
that courts apply to decide a case. If positivism had become the dominant
theory of law in the 20th century, then the Erie Court had to determine
whether any positivist source of authority gave federal courts authority to
diverge from state court views on a question of tort law.
It is also true, as Jack Goldsmith and Steven Walt have explained, 8
that positivism did not necessarily require a negative answer to that
question. The leading pre-Erie case holding that federal courts need not
follow state courts’ interpretation of the common law was Swift v. Tyson, 9
decided by Justice Story way back in 1842. Story was an early-adopter of
positivism, and nothing in Swift was necessarily inconsistent with the
position that law must derive its authority from some form of social
acceptance, rather than from some transcendent truth. There is no
straightforward causal relationship between legal positivism and Erie’s
rejection of Swift.
The particular law applied in Swift was the law merchant, a body of
customary principles governing dealings among sophisticated
commercial actors typically operating across jurisdictional lines. The law
merchant, also called the general commercial law, was the 19th century’s
version of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). It sought to mirror as
closely as possible the customary practices of merchants in the real world.
Much like the UCC, the general commercial law gave legal sanction to
customary courses of dealing that private participants in markets had
worked out for themselves. It thus drew its authority from not one, but
two perfectly positivist forms of social acceptance: first, from its
customary acceptance by the parties to commercial transactions
themselves; second, from the generally explicit decision by state
governments to adopt the law merchant to govern transactions falling
within its scope—just as all contemporary state governments have
adopted the UCC. 10 And so when Justice Story disagreed in Swift with the
7. See Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 604 (2008); see also
Michael Steven Green, Erie’s Suppressed Premise, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (2011)
(demonstrating that Swift was compatible with positivism).
8. See Jack Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal Positivism, 84 VA.
L. REV. 673 (1998).
9. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
10. See generally RANDALL BRIDWELL & RALPH U. WHITTEN, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
COMMON LAW (1977).
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state courts of New York on the proper interpretation of the law merchant,
he did so secure in the knowledge that the New York courts and legislature
had already agreed that disputes like Swift, whether they occurred in state
or federal court, were governed by a body of law that was neither state nor
federal but general in nature. 11
This decentralized form of law held together better and longer than
one might think, 12 but by the end of the 19th century it was breaking down.
The law merchant was fairly narrow in scope, and it tended to govern
matters where most would agree it was more important that the rules be
settled than that they be settled right. In this area, which excluded tort,
property, and even non-commercial contracts, states generally accepted
that general law should apply in order to ensure they were included in the
system of interstate commerce. 13 But by the late 19th century, federal
courts had extended the general law to cover non-commercial matters—
like the duty of care owed by a railroad to a trespasser in Erie—where
states had stronger normative pressures. 14 It was more important, in these
more controversial arenas, that matters be settled right than that they be
settled the same way as in other jurisdictions. And so, the federal courts’
application of general principles in diversity cases had the effect of
displacing deliberate state policy choices.
What all this meant was that the general law could no longer be
justified in positivist terms; in areas like torts, there was no argument that
states had opted to be governed by general rather than particular state
rules. And in fact, federal court decisions tended to justify applying
general law instead by anti-positivist notions of the general law’s “truth”
or “justice”—not its acceptance by any particular jurisdiction.15 And so
the Erie Court’s commitment to positivism forced it to ask whether the
general law could any longer be justified by the will of a relevant
sovereign. For reasons I’ll return to in a moment, the Court found that it
could not. Only two kinds of law existed with respect to the dispute in

11. See Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18.
12. See William Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of
1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1562-63 (1984).
13. See id. at 1518-21; Bridwell & Whitten, supra note 10, at 61-97.
14. See, e.g., TONY FREYER, HARMONY & DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT & ERIE CASES IN
AMERICAN FEDERALISM 45, 58 1981).
15. See, e.g., Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 378 (1893) (“[T]he question is
essentially one of general law. It does not depend upon any statute; it does not spring from any local
usage or custom; there is in it no rule of property, but it rests upon those considerations of right and
justice which have been gathered into the great body of the rules and principles known as the ‘common
law.’”) (emphasis added).
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question, and in the absence of federal authority to apply a federal rule,
the Court had no choice but to apply state law. 16
Before exploring that, however, I pause to stress how Erie is
consistent with—and perhaps our most self-conscious articulation of—
modern lawyers’ sensibility that law is not transcendent but rather the
product of authority (and in our legal system, traceable to some form of
democratic choice). If I assert a legal proposition, you are likely to
respond, “Says who?” That reflex goes so much without saying that we
tend not to associate it with any particular case. But if we had to pick one,
I submit that it would be Erie.
Erie’s rejection of general law, and the general notion that law is only
law because it has been adopted as such by people authorized to do so, are
both under subtle but important kinds of pressure in our modern legal
culture. Law schools create a fair amount of that pressure without even
meaning to do so. Those of us who are not federal jurisdiction or choice
of law geeks—and I recognize the proportion of those geeks in this
audience is unusually high—are used to pursuing the “best” or “right”
answer to substantive law questions. What is the optimal rule for
spreading losses or producing corrective justice in tort law? What is the
best standard for resolving difficult questions of child custody in family
law? Once we think we’ve puzzled out the right answer, it’s easy to jump
to the conclusion that every jurisdiction should apply that answer simply
because it’s right or true. And the need to persuade multiple
decisionmakers—state legislatures, state courts, etc.—starts to seem like
an annoying impediment.
Hence the activities of the American Law Institute, for example,
which continues to develop and expand the closest thing we moderns have
to “general” law. 17 At my law school, first-year criminal law students

16. See Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 805, 820 (1989) (“[A]t
the heart of [Erie] was the positivistic insight that American law must be either federal law or state
law. There could be no overarching or hybrid third option.”). In my view, “with respect to the dispute
in question” in the text is an important qualification. I have argued elsewhere that Erie would not
forbid applying general law in certain contexts, especially where it is not supplanting otherwiseapplicable state law. See Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate over Customary International Law,
42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 492-96 (2002) (suggesting that customary international law could be applied
as general law to govern human rights litigation to which no state has sufficient contacts to apply its
own law).
17. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS (1981); see generally American Law Institute, About ALI, https://www.ali.org/about-ali/
[https://perma.cc/SGZ3-NETB] (describing the ALI’s activities). Your humble author is a member of
the ALI but remains nervous about the extent to which these projects exercise an unduly centralizing
influence on state law.
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don’t learn the law of any particular jurisdiction; rather, they are taught a
brooding omnipresence in the sky called the “Model Penal Code.” 18
Consider also the modern version of customary international law,
which makes up much of the contemporary law of human rights.
Customary international law is supposed to derive from the common
practice of nations, undertaken from a sense of opinio juris or legal
obligation. In the modern era, however, customary international law has
become much less about custom—what nations actually do—and much
more about the legal obligation. 19 Customary international law is driven,
in other words, by normative judgments about what rules are just. It’s a
great deal like the late-stage general law that Erie rejected. 20
Perhaps most important, however, is the increasing temptation to use
the Constitution itself as a hook to impose whatever legal rules we think
are just and right, overriding the positivist choices of legislatures at both
the state and national levels. Last Fall, my colleague and friend, Jed Purdy,
published a piece in the New York Times called “The Left’s Guide to
Reclaiming the Constitution.” 21 Professor Purdy thinks that liberals
should quit futzing around playing defense and go for the gusto by
working “to define a jurisprudence of economic citizenship, strong
democracy and inclusive justice that will help a resurgent left reclaim the
Constitution.” This would include things like free higher-education,
publicly-funded abortion, and felon enfranchisement as constitutional
rights. 22 I guess I’m for some of these things and against others, but what
struck me was how Purdy doesn’t even try to show how these rights can
be grounded in the meaning of the Constitution we’ve ratified. For him,
these things are rights because they’re grounded in a political theory of
strong democracy and equality. They are rights because they are true, not
because they have been endorsed by any positivist sovereign. It is a leftwing form of natural rights. As a child of Erie, I have hard time even

18. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. GARVEY, CRIMINAL LAW, CASES AND
MATERIALS (8th ed. 2019).
19. See Patrick J. Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449,
470 (2000); Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens,
and General Principles, 12 AUSTRL. Y.B. INT’L L. 82, 89-90 (1992).
20. See, e.g., Young, Sorting, supra note 16, at 398-400.
21. Jedediah Purdy, The Left’s Guide to Reclaiming the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/10/opinion/brett-kavanaugh-supreme-court-constitutiondemocrats-.html [https://perma.cc/Q6ZM-2MHZ].
22. See id.; see also Mark Tushnet, Abandoning Defensive Crouch Liberal Constitutionalism,
BALKINIZATION (May 6, 2016), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2016/05/abandoning-defensive-crouchliberal.html [https://perma.cc/5FED-TYQ9] (arguing that liberal judges should aggressively
constitutionalize a range of leftward policy aspirations).
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beginning to think in those terms. But I think this kind of discourse is
increasingly common.
I don’t wish to be heard as picking on the Left exclusively—and
especially not as picking on Professor Purdy. The truth is that the Right is
very good at the same sort of thing. Decades before Justice Brandeis
buried the general common law in Erie, the Court’s general law
jurisprudence was already morphing into a constitutional discourse much
like Purdy’s. 23 Cases like Lochner v. New York 24 took the contractual
entitlements protected under the general common law and read them into
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process Clauses, so that both
state legislatures and Congress itself would be unable to override them.
And they did this in a way that protected big business from government
regulation. There was very little historical or textual support for reading
these principles into the Constitution, but that wasn’t the point. As with
the general common law in the first place, freedom of contract was
binding because it was true and right, not because it had been adopted by
some lawmaking institution in the good old positivist way.
As you all know, Lochner’s experiment didn’t end well for the Court
or for the nation. 25 Attempts to impose law without the institutional
legitimation that positivism demands rarely do.
II. ERIE AND THE FEDERAL COURTS
The second respect in which Erie signifies a broad way of life and
law is in its view of the role of the federal courts. In Erie’s positivist
universe, courts are not oracles or logicians; they interpret and apply the
law not because it is true or deducible from universal postulates, but rather
because they have a democratic mandate to do so. And it turns out that the
nature of that mandate diverges between federal and state courts. Erie has
thus come to stand for the proposition that, unlike state courts, federal
courts generally lack any sort of lawmaking power.
Erie is sometimes described as a case about the limits of national
lawmaking power, full stop. 26 This view would say that courts could not

23. See, e.g., Lucas A. Powe, Jr., Rehearsal for Substantive Due Process: The Municipal Bond
Cases, 53 TEX. L. REV. 738 (1975).
24. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
25. See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term—Foreword: The Constitution
of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 32, 73 (1993)
(observing that Lochner “stands as the very symbol, after Dred Scott, of the Supreme Court’s periodic
tendencies toward institutional suicide”).
26. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Perils of Theory, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1567, 1571-73
(2008).
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apply federal law in a case like Erie because the underlying subject
matter—railroad torts—was within the reserved power of the states. But
even before the Court’s 1937 switch-in-time and recognition of broad
congressional power under the Commerce Clause, 27 which occurred after
the initial round of litigation in Erie but before the Supreme Court’s
decision in 1938, one would have been hard pressed to say the matter lay
outside the limits of national legislative power.28 Cases like the
Shreveport Rate Cases 29 in 1914 had accorded Congress broad authority
to regulate the actual instrumentalities of interstate commerce—for
example, planes, trains, and automobiles. When Brandeis’s opinion said
that “Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law
applicable in a State whether they be local in their nature or ‘general,’ be
they commercial law or a part of the law of torts,” 30 he could not have
meant that Congress had no power to legislate upon those subjects. He
could not have meant to question, for example, the validity of the Federal
Employers Liability Act, 31 which provided federal tort rules to govern
claims by railroad workers. 32
Justice Brandeis was suggesting that Congress could not pass a
statute making the judge-made general common law applicable in the
states. 33 And because Congress had not, in any event, purported to do such
a thing, the crucial point was Brandeis’s observation that “no clause in the
Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.” 34
In summarizing his constitutional objection, Brandeis again insisted that
“the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson is, as Mr. Justice Holmes said, ‘an
unconstitutional assumption of powers by the Courts of the United
States.’” 35
Erie is thus fundamentally a case about judicial lawmaking. The
federal courts’ power to formulate common law rules is not coextensive

27. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
28. See generally Ely, supra note 2, at 702; Young, General Defense, supra note *, at 67.
29. Houston East & West Texas Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
30. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
31. 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. (1908).
32. Justice Brandeis encountered the FELA in his first term on the Court, in New York Central
Railroad v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147 (1917). Although he dissented from the Court’s determination that
the FELA preempted the entire field of railroad workers’ remedies, he acknowledged Congress’s
broad power in the area: “That Congress could have done this is clear. The question presented is: Has
Congress done so?” Id. at 154 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
33. See Young, General Defense, supra note *, at 69; see also Aaron Nielson, Erie as
Nondelegation, 72 OHIO ST. L. J. 239 (2011).
34. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
35. Id. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab &
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
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with Congress’s power to legislate. 36 In recent years, Erie-skeptics like
Suzanna Sherry and Louise Weinberg relied on scattered suggestions by
members of the Founding Generation that legislative and judicial power
are “coextensive.” 37 There are a variety of problems with this position, but
the principal one is that the proposition that legislatures and courts have
the power to act in a coextensive set of circumstances hardly proves that
they have the power to act in the same way. Article III makes federal
judicial power coextensive in the sense that federal courts can adjudicate
any matter upon which Congress legislates a federal rule of decision,38 but
that hardly means that the courts can create a federal rule themselves if
Congress has not. Likewise, Congress’s commerce power might be
coextensive with Article III’s diversity jurisdiction in that Congress could
regulate any transaction involving parties from different states.39 But that
would hardly mean that courts could create federal common law to govern
such disputes.
In any event, American constitutional law is replete with examples
demonstrating that federal legislative and judicial power are not
coextensive. Congress, for example, does not require a “case or
controversy” in order to act. The doctrines prohibiting advisory opinions,
requiring a particular plaintiff with standing, and insisting a dispute must
be ripe for adjudication are all about differentiating the circumstances in
which federal courts may act from those in which a legislature may make
law.
Erie likewise makes clear that the federal courts do not share the
general lawmaking powers generally attributed to the state courts. State
courts have long been understood as playing a broader lawmaking role
than does the federal judiciary, 40 although the boundaries of state court

36. See Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) (“[N]or does the
existence of congressional authority under Art. I mean that federal courts are free to develop a
common law to govern those areas until Congress acts.”); see also Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine and
the Constitution, 53 Nw. U. L. Rev. 427, 441 (1958); Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on
Erie—The Thread, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1682, 1683 (1974); Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers
as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1414 (2001).
37. See Sherry, supra note 3, at 145; Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 805, 813 (1989).
38. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (vesting jurisdiction in the federal courts to decide cases
“arising under . . . the Laws of the United States”).
39. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824) (explaining that Congress’s
power extends to “commerce which concerns more States than one”).
40. See, e.g., Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 534-35 (Holmes, J., dissenting); Burt
Neuborne, State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L. J. 881, 896-97
(1989).
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lawmaking remain somewhat controversial. 41 It’s worth noting, for
example, that when one sees path-marking common law opinions by a
federal judge—like Learned Hand’s opinions in The T.J. Hooper 42 or
United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 43—there’s usually a boat involved.
That’s because maritime law is the only area where federal judges are still
accorded general lawmaking power. 44 Erie insisted, by contrast, that
“[t]here is no federal general common law.” 45 It’s true that Erie has been
read to leave room for a more particularized form of federal common law
grounded in federal statutes and federal interests; Judge Friendly called
this the “new federal common law.” 46 But the federal courts lack any
freestanding lawmaking authority apart from some prior action by the
national political branches. 47
Erie’s view of the federal judicial role has been influential far beyond
the common law context in which the case arose. In particular, it
profoundly shapes contemporary debates about the role of judicial review
in constitutional cases. The accusation that judges are “legislating from
the bench” has particular bite because we are steeped in Erie’s norm that
federal judges are not supposed to be lawmakers. Likewise, Erie has
powered the critique of efforts to apply customary international law to
displace state law norms without action by Congress. 48
Erie’s conception of the federal judicial role is under threat from a
very different direction, however. The point of Erie’s particular holding
was that individual states’ choices about the content of their tort law
would be respected by federal courts sitting in diversity, the expectation
being that a multiplicity of jurisdictions might well arrive at a multiplicity
of solutions to common problems. The reality of modern tort litigation,
however, is much different. Nearly 40 percent of civil cases on the federal

41. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, A Critical Guide to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 54 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 921, 980 (2013) (pointing out that “no state constitution actually includes such an
explicit allocation of the state’s lawmaking authority to the state’s highest court”). I have addressed
Professor Nelson’s argument at greater length elsewhere. See Young, General Defense, supra note *,
at 100-08.
42. 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
43. 160 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1947).
44. See Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 281-82 (1999).
45. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
46. Henry Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 383, 422 (1964).
47. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Preemption and Federal Common Law, 85 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1639, 1659-64 (2008).
48. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 815 (1997); Young,
Sorting, supra note 16.

ERIE 01 YOUNG MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

ERIE AS A WAY OF LIFE

5/6/2019 9:32 AM

185

docket are now part of the multidistrict litigation process (MDLs); as class
actions have become easier to remove to federal court but harder to
actually certify, MDLs have become the dominant means of resolving
mass torts. 49 Cases arising from a particular dangerous product or other
mass tort may be filed all over the country, but the MDL process
consolidates them for pretrial purposes before a single district judge. 50
And although these cases are nominally supposed to return to their
original courts for trial, the overwhelming majority of these cases are
settled in the MDL court. 51 It thus matters not that individual states’ laws
would govern these cases if they were ever remanded and tried. 52 As a
practical matter, the MDL court will force a settlement based on a general
view of the aggregate merits in all the cases.
This system of “one court to rule them all” sweeps away the limited
role of the federal judge that Erie envisioned and the multiplicity of legal
choices and decisionmakers that Erie sought to preserve. There are many
reasons to be nervous about MDL—for instance, its near total lack of
formal rules for handling the cases once they are crammed together. But
one of the casualties is surely Erie’s modest role of federal judging.
III. ERIE AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
The third aspect of Erie that I offer for consideration is Erie and the
federal system. By holding that federal judges lack lawmaking powers of
their own, Erie enlisted the national separation of powers in the cause of
federalism. And in so doing, Justice Brandeis helped frame the basic
structure of contemporary intergovernmental relations that has endured
from the late 1930s to the present. Every year, I tell my Constitutional
Law students that Erie is the most important case about federalism
decided in the 20th century and I lament the outrageous unfairness that

49. See generally Andrew D. Bradt, The Long Arm of Multidistrict Litigation, 59 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1165, 1165 (2018); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 71, 74 (2015).
50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976).
51. See Duke Law School, Center for Judicial Studies, MDL Standards and Best Practices xi
(2014),
https://judicialstudies.duke.edu/sites/default/files/centers/judicialstudies/MDL_Standards_and_Best
_Practices_2014-REVISED.pdf [https://perma.cc/VVV7-DMNA].
52. As a matter of law, the choice of law rules applicable to MDL cases are complex and
unresolved. See, e.g., Andrew D. Bradt, The Shortest Distance: Direct Filing and Choice of Law in
Multidistrict Litigation, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 759, 760 (2012). My point, however, is the simpler
one that because most MDL cases are managed and settled rather than tried, their disposition is likely
to be dominated by broad pragmatic judgments about the merits that are not likely to reflect the diverse
laws of particular states.
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the case falls within their Civil Procedure professor’s jurisdiction rather
than mine. Even 80 years later, Erie represents a paradigm of federalism
that is both descriptively satisfying and normatively attractive.
For much of our history, American federalism has been dominated
by a different paradigm: “dual federalism.” The dual federalism regime
divided up the world into separate and mutually-exclusive spheres of
national and state authority. The national government ruled over foreign
affairs, interstate commerce, and certain specifically-enumerated
specialty categories like bankruptcy and intellectual property. The states,
on the other hand, enjoyed reserved authority over intrastate commerce
and such noncommercial subjects as education and family law. It fell to
the courts in this regime to determine the precise boundary between
national and state power and to invalidate any intrusion by one
government into the other’s sphere. 53
Dual federalism went largely by the boards after 1937, once the
Supreme Court changed course and acknowledged broad congressional
power to regulate virtually the entire economy. 54 Since then, American
federalism has been a regime of largely concurrent regulatory jurisdiction.
Although the Supreme Court continues to enforce some limits on national
legislative powers, Congress can basically regulate whatever it likes. At
the same time, the Court has transformed its dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, thereby expanding the ability of state governments to
regulate commercial matters even though they are intertwined with the
national market. 55
In this concurrent sort of regime, two questions become crucial: First,
how can conflicts between state and federal law be identified and
resolved? This issue is largely governed by the preemption doctrine under
the Supremacy Clause. And second, what are the default rules going to be
in cases where Congress has not legislated? The first preface to the famous
Hart and Wechsler casebook in Federal Courts identified this second
question as crucial, deemphasizing cases involving the outer limits of
Congress’s enumerated powers:
For every case in which a court is asked to invalidate a square assertion
of state or federal legislative authority, there are many more in which

53. See generally Ernest A. Young, The Puzzling Persistence of Dual Federalism, in NOMOS
LV: FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY 34 (James E. Fleming & Jacob T. Levy, eds., 2014).
54. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 1 (1937); Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111, 118 (1942); see generally Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA.
L. REV. 1 (1950).
55. See, e.g., Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the
States, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 484 (1997).
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the allocation of control does not involve questions of ultimate power;
Congress has been silent with respect to the displacement of the normal
state-created norms, leaving courts to face the problem as an issue of
choice of law. 56

Erie confronted this choice of law problem directly. Although Congress
had “ultimate power” to regulate torts along the railroad right-of-way, it
had “been silent with respect to the displacement” of state law. By holding
that state law must control in that extremely common scenario, Erie
carved out a lasting and significant role for state law and state courts
without attempting to impose a categorical, dual-federalism-style limit on
the scope of national legislative power.
Federal law, in this vision, is broad in its potential scope but
interstitial in its basic character. As Hart and Wechsler famously put it,
Federal legislation . . . builds upon legal relationships established by the
states, altering or supplanting them only so far as necessary for the
special purpose. Congress acts, in short, against the background of the
total corpus juris of the states in much the way that a state legislature
acts against the background of the common law, assumed to govern
unless changed by legislation. 57

The drawback of this interstitial model from the states’ point of view, of
course, is that it de-emphasizes hard-and-fast limits on the expansion of
federal legislation over time. And in fact, we have seen significant
expansion of the scope of federal law over the course of the last century,
to the extent that federal law is now primary—not interstitial—in a
number of important fields.
The primary constraints on that expansion are of two kinds. The first
are political, consisting of the states’ representation in Congress as well
as other mechanisms by which state governments can influence national
decisionmakers. 58 Although there are any number of reasons to question
the efficacy of these “political safeguards” of federalism in practice, 59
56. HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM, preface (1st ed. 1953).
57. Id. at 435; see also Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 489 (1954) (developing this view).
58. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 546 (1954);
JOHN D. NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: HOW STATES PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS IN
NATIONAL POLICYMAKING (2009) (exploring the operation of political safeguards in practice).
59. See, e.g., Saikrishna B. Prakash & John Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459 (2001) (criticizing old and new versions of the political
safeguards theory); see also Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard
of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 106–33 (2001).
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there is little doubt that they afford the states at least some voice in the
national legislative process. But the second, more procedural set of
constraints may be more efficacious. These constraints arise from the
sheer difficulty of making federal law, given the numerous contending
interests, limited agenda space, and multiple veto-gates in that process. 60
As those of us who grew up on Schoolhouse Rock know, it’s hard for even
the most deserving and persevering bill to become a federal law. 61
In a federalism paradigm built on political and procedural
safeguards, the primary threats to state autonomy come from modes of
national lawmaking that circumvent these safeguards by bypassing
Congress. 62 If Congress must make federal law, then there won’t be much
of it. It was big news at the time of this writing when Congress even
managed to pass part of a budget; 63 we’re certainly not holding our breath
for new regulatory legislation. As the country transitioned from dual
federalism to concurrent jurisdiction in the early 20th century, the primary
form of federal lawmaking without Congress was judge-made general
common law. The states are not represented in private diversity suits, and
a common law judge confronts no supermajority requirements or vetogates in legislating from the bench. By insisting that federal courts apply
state law in the absence of a federal statute, Erie reaffirmed federal law’s
interstitial character and shored up the political and procedural safeguards
of federalism. 64
Some critics of Erie object to it precisely because it is a relic of dual
federalism, 65 but they could hardly be more wrong on this point. The
argument seems to be that because Erie enforced a constitutional limit on
national lawmaking, it necessarily partook of all the evils of the old
regime. But such thinking conflates dual federalism with, well, federalism
itself. Contemporary constitutional law has not scrapped the notion that
the national government is one of limited and enumerated powers. It has
simply de-emphasized the subject-matter constraints built into provisions
like the Commerce Clause in favor of the enumerated limits on the process
of federal lawmaking—that is, the political representation of the states and
60. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, The Procedural Safeguards of Federalism, 83 NOTRE DAME
L. REV.1681 (2008).
61. See Schoolhouse Rock, I’m Just a Bill, YOUTUBE (Dec. 8, 2011),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FFroMQlKiag.
62. See generally Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 36.
63. See Natalie Andrews & Kristina Peterson, Lawmakers Reach Deal to Avoid Shutdown
Drama Before Midterms, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/congresspasses-minibus-spending-package-1536869066 [https://perma.cc/HQV6-GMSK].
64. See Young, General Defense, supra note *, at 67-76.
65. See, e.g., Sherry, supra note 3, at 142-44; Green, supra note 8, at 607-09.
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the procedural gauntlet that national legislation must run. 66 The old dual
federalism regime foundered because the subject-matter boundaries upon
which it depended turned out to be indeterminate, but Erie’s regime
largely avoids that problem by focusing on how and by whom federal law
is made. No legal regime is perfect in our fallen world, but arguments
against Erie cannot simply recycle the old complaints about dual
federalism.
Erie placed a strong limit on federal common lawmaking, and that
limit has mostly stuck. As the Court said some four decades after Erie,
“instances [of federal common law] are ‘few and restricted,’ and fall into
essentially two categories: those in which a federal rule of decision is
‘necessary to protect uniquely federal interests,’ and those in which
Congress has given the courts the power to develop substantive law.” 67
The far more common way to circumvent Congress nowadays is through
administrative agencies. One need only go down to the library and
compare the size of the U.S. Code with the Code of Federal Regulations
and the Federal Register to see that most federal law is now made by
federal agencies. These agencies do not represent the state in any direct or
automatic way, and they exist precisely because they can make federal
law so much more easily than Congress.
Under conditions of polarization and legislative gridlock, the agency
route of executive lawmaking becomes even more attractive. 68 As
President Obama said, the President has a pen and a phone and if Congress
doesn’t act, he can act in their stead.69 Not surprisingly, a primary means
of state participation in the national political process is now by filing
lawsuits to challenge these sorts of executive actions in the federal
courts. 70 Those lawsuits, which have unfortunately taken on a highly
partisan cast under both this administration and the last one, are unlikely
to prove as effective at protecting state autonomy as Erie’s original model
of judicial federalism.

66. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against
Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 257-65 (2012).
67. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981).
68. See Margaret H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young, State Public Law Litigation in an Age of
Polarization, 97 TEX. L. REV. 46 (2018).
69. Obama-I’ve Got a Pen and a Phone, YOUTUBE, (March 31, 2016),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G6tOgF_w-yI; Kenneth S. Lowande & Sidney M. Milkis, “We
Can’t Wait”: Barack Obama, Partisan Polarization and the Administrative Presidency, 12 THE
FORUM 3 (2014).
70. See Lemos & Young, supra note 68, at 66-68; Daniel Francis, Litigation as a Political
Safeguard of Federalism, 49 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1023 (2017).
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IV. ERIE AND THE LEGAL PROCESS
Finally, Erie was not only central to the view of federalism taken by
the generation of scholars like Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler. As
Professor Green has suggested in his contribution to this Symposium, 71
Erie nicely embodies the Legal Process School of jurisprudence that those
scholars propounded as a response to (and antidote for) Legal Realism. 72
The realists poured cold water all over the notion that law is a fully
determinate system derivable from either math-like logic or transcendent
principles. They highlighted the existence of divergent perspectives and
political conflict within the law. 73 Legal Process emerged as an effort to
put the law back together again in the wake of this assault. Its central
preoccupation was how to have law in the face of persistent disagreement
and uncertainty. For Henry Hart and Al Sacks, who pioneered the legal
process vision in their famous casebook, “[t]he alternative to
disintegrating resort to violence is the establishment of regularized and
peaceable methods of decision.” 74
The key component of Legal Process jurisprudence for my purposes
is the principle of institutional settlement, which holds that “decisions
which are the duly arrived at result of duly established procedures of this
kind ought to be accepted as binding upon the whole society unless and
until they are duly changed.” 75 You can see the influence of Realism on
this principle. It starts by conceding that the law is sometimes
indeterminate and that we’re likely never to agree altogether on the “right
answer” to a lot of legal questions. We still, however, have to live together
and muddle through somehow. The answer, for the Legal Process School,
is that we should at least try to agree on allocating the authority to make
a final decision to somebody. And we should agree—in advance—that
we’ll all accept whatever that decision turns out to be.
One important corollary to this is that the authority to decide must at
least sometimes include the authority to get the decision wrong. 76 If my
wife asks me to dress our daughter before she heads off to daycare, I
71. See Craig Green, Erie and Constitutional Structure: An Intellectual History, 52 AKRON L.
REV. 257 (2019).
72. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47
VAND. L. REV. 953 (1994); NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 205-99
(1995).
73. See, e.g., Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM.
L. REV. 809 (1935).
74. HENRY M. HART, JR., & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 4 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, eds. 1994).
75. Id.
76. See Fallon, supra note 72, at 962.
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expect her to respect my choice of the cute dress with the pink rabbits on
it even if she might have preferred the dress with the rainbow stripes. The
decision is institutionally settled—in the first instance—in Dear Old Dad.
There are limits, of course. If I send the kid downstairs in shorts and a tshirt when it’s 20 degrees outside, that initial decision is getting reversed.
But the question of whether the initial decisionmaker is to be overruled
has to be different in kind from asking simply what Mom might have
decided on the merits in the first instance. You don’t send the kid back
upstairs just because you like the rainbows better than the rabbits.
We see this principle throughout the law. It lies behind standards of
review limiting how appellate courts revise the judgments of lower
courts. 77 They can reverse a trial court’s factual findings or discretionary
judgments, for example, but only by overcoming a highly deferential
standard. The same notion undergirds Chevron deference to agency
interpretations of federal statute. 78 A court reviewing such an
interpretation does not simply ask whether it would have reached the same
conclusion in the first instance, but rather whether the agency’s decision
falls outside a bound of reasonableness.
I think Erie fits this broad Legal Process paradigm to a T. Consider
how that decision requires a federal court to approach a question of tort
law, like the duty of care owed by a railroad to a person walking along the
right of way. Erie begins with the proposition that there is more than one
way to skin this cat: tort law is a series of legal choices made by state
jurisdictions, rather than a matter of logical deduction from first
principles. We are open to the possibility that diverse views exist, and
multiple approaches may be reasonable.
And Erie embodies a principle of institutional settlement. It vests
control of the content of the common law in the state courts even if the
federal court might think a different approach is more logical, better
policy, or simply truer to the spirit of tort law. 79 Here, too, there are limits.
State legal choices may be preempted by federal statutes, and federal
courts have doctrinal tools to curb state common law interpretations that

77. See generally HARRY T. EDWARDS, LINDA A. ELLIOTT, & MARIN K. LEVY, FEDERAL
STANDARDS OF REVIEW: REVIEW OF DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS AND AGENCY ACTIONS (2d ed.
2013).
78. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
79. Erie performs this office in conjunction with Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20
Wall.) 590 (1874), which held that the Supreme Court ordinarily may not review state court decisions
on the meaning of state law. See Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common
Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 921 (1986) (“Together Murdock and Erie give states control over their
own law.”).
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retroactively undermine established rights.80 But in general, Erie tells
prestigious, life-tenured federal judges to respect state law and be guided
by the principle: What would the state supreme court do?
Casting Erie as the poster-child for Legal Process jurisprudence may
strike many of you as condemnation rather than praise—after all, the
Legal Process School is not exactly stylish. I gave a talk some years ago
at the University of Chicago, which considers itself a pretty cutting- edge
place, about the virtues of Legal Process jurisprudence as a way to think
about international adjudication. 81 They looked at me as if I had two
heads—if, that is, it were possible to regard a person with two heads as
not only weird but also utterly banal and uninteresting. In a review of Ed
Purcell’s wonderful book on Erie, Susan Bandes condemned the Legal
Process School for “advocat[ing] an insularity that sought to exclude a
whole host of influences and contingencies—political, cultural, historical,
and practical.” 82
There are all sorts of things wrong with this vein of criticism,
beginning with the fact that it depends on ignoring what the Legal Process
scholars actually said and did. 83 But I want to focus on the more general
claim that the Legal Process School is simply behind the times and has
nothing to say to us today. That claim, I suggest, could hardly be more
wrong.
Let’s focus on institutional settlement first. It’s not a natural human
reaction to distinguish between whether I think another person is wrong
and whether that person is unreasonably wrong. But we train lawyers that
this distinction is important. This is why I tell my Federal Courts students
that Hart and Wechsler can make them better people. The Legal Process
School teaches that in many human situations, it’s crucial to respect and
even defer to someone else’s judgment on a question notwithstanding that
you’d have reached a different conclusion. To take just one example, this
is surely an important key to a successful marriage.
More broadly, the Legal Process School responded to two broad and
related sets of phenomena: a breakdown of social consensus and a crisis
80. See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Fla. Dep’t. of Env’t. Prot., 560 U.S. 702 (2010);
see also Stacey L. Dogan & Ernest A. Young, Judicial Takings and Collateral Attack on State Court
Property Decisions, 6 DUKE J. CON. L. & PUB. POL’Y 107, 108-09 (2011).
81. See Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in a Globalizing Judicial System, 54 DUKE
L. J. 1143 (2005).
82. Susan Bandes, Erie and the History of the One True Federalism, 110 YALE L. J. 829, 830
(2001) (reviewing EDWARD A. PURCELL JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE,
THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICA (2000)).
83. See Young, General Defense, supra note *, at 87.
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of faith in the integrity of law as separate from politics. Scholars like Hart,
Sacks, and Wechsler urged a focus on fair structures of governance and
decision-making procedures as a means of finding common ground in this
conflict-ridden and disenchanted world. 84 That basic set of problems
ought to sound awfully familiar to lawyers in the early 21st century. We
have had our own Legal Realist-type challenges in the Critical Legal
Studies movement, followed by the Attitudinalists in political science who
purport to have disproven the notion that judges act according to legal
principle. 85 In his Harvard Law Review Foreword in 2005, Judge Richard
Posner accepted this claim and declared that the Supreme Court “is a
political organ.” 86 If anyone doubts that our community has lost faith in
the integrity of law as distinct from politics, then I would refer them to the
recent hearings on Brett Kavanaugh’s nomination to the Supreme Court. 87
And of course the current breakdown of political consensus hardly
requires further documentation from me. Political scientists report the
extent of political polarization and its tendency to render institutions of
governance dysfunctional. 88 Legal scholars worry about the disintegration
of norms. 89 Political psychologists document the translation of political
disagreement into active dislike of one’s fellow citizens. 90 But one need
not look to the academic literature; one can simply read the news. Our
President has endorsed violent responses by his supporters to hecklers. 91
A senior leader of a major political party has announced that one “cannot

84.
85.

See Fallon, supra note 72, at 964.
See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL AND HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
86. Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Foreword: A Political Court, 119
HARV. L. REV. 32, 34 (2005).
87. See, e.g., Tessa Berenson, How an Emotional Day of Kavanaugh Testimonies Reinforced
the Country’s Polarized Views, TIME (Sept. 28, 2018), http://time.com/5409246/christine-ford-brettkavanaugh-politics/ [https://perma.cc/54AM-45AT]; see also Associated Press, Chief Justice Notes
Kavanaugh Case, Cites Dangers of “Political Pressure,” CBS NEWS (Oct. 17, 2018 8:06 AM), at
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/john-roberts-chief-justice-stresses-independence-minnesota-speech
[https://perma.cc/P9LU-H3CE].
88. See, e.g., CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY, AMERICAN GRIDLOCK: THE SOURCES, CHARACTER,
AND IMPACT OF POLITICAL POLARIZATION (James A. Thurber & Antoine Yoshinaka, eds., 2016).
89. See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, Political Norms, Constitutional Conventions, and President
Donald Trump, 93 IND. L. J. 177 (2018).
90. See, e.g., LILLIANA MASON, UNCIVIL AGREEMENT: HOW POLITICS BECAME OUR
IDENTITY (2018).
91. See, e.g., Louis Jacobson & Manuela Tobias, Has Donald Trump Never ‘Promoted or
Encouraged Violence,’ as Sarah Huckabee Sanders Said? POLITIFACT (July 5, 2017, 10:31 AM),
https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2017/jul/05/sarah-huckabee-sanders/hasdonald-trump-never-promoted-or-encouraged-viol/ [https://perma.cc/GP9G-DAKF].
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be civil” with the other party. 92 A senior Member of Congress has
exhorted partisans to stalk and harass people who work for the
Administration. 93 We have even seen an attempt to assassinate one party’s
congressional leadership 94 and a series of pipe bombs mailed to major
figures in the other party. 95 It seems reasonable to worry about the
“disintegrating resort to violence” that the Legal Process scholars warned
about in the event that people fail to find common ground in the rule of
law.
In the current moment, Erie’s humility—its willingness to let people
agree to disagree on questions of substance in exchange for a common
ground on processes for dispute resolution—seems like precisely the sort
of mindset that might help us move forward. And its commitment to
federalism, which allows different jurisdictions to pursue their own vision
on at least some questions, might allow us to finesse some of the most
divisive questions. 96 No one thinks the Legal Process School represents
some sort of golden age, but no one should be foolish enough to believe
that our present age holds all the answers either.
V. CONCLUSION
Both critics and defenders of Erie like to describe it as a myth. 97 They
debate whether we ought to continue to believe in that myth. I’m tempted
to respond to that suggestion as Mark Twain did when asked if he believed
in infant baptism. “Believe in it?” he said. “Hell, I’ve seen it done.” 98 I
92. See Rachel Ventresca, Clinton: ‘You Cannot Be Civil with a Political Party that Wants to
Destroy What You Stand For, CNN (Oct. 9, 2018, 9:52 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/09/
politics/hillary-clinton-civility-congress-cnntv/index.html [https://perma.cc/95RE-8ER].
93. Jamie Ehrlich, Maxine Waters Encourages Supporters to Harass Trump Administration
Officials, CNN (June 25, 2018, 2:02 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/25/politics/maxine-waterstrump-officials/index.html [https://perma.cc/8XGL-KGG7].
94. See Michael D. Shear, Adam Goldman, & Emily Cochrane, Congressman Steve Scalise
Gravely Wounded in Alexandria Baseball Field Ambush, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/14/us/steve-scalise-congress-shot-alexandria-virginia.html
[https://perma.cc/4C26-NECK]; Jose Pagliery, Suspect in Congressional Shooting Was Bernie
Sanders Supporter, Strongly Anti-Trump, CNN (June 15, 2017, 5:20 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/14/homepage2/james-hodgkinson-profile/index.html
[https://perma.cc/7YJ8-MDMW].
95. See, e.g., William K. Rashbaum, Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama and CNN Offices are Sent
Pipe Bombs, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/24/nyregion/clintonobama-explosive-device.html [https://perma.cc/7242-TUX2].
96. See, e.g., Lemos & Young, supra note 68, at 51-53 (discussing federalism as a way of
mitigating the effects of partisan polarization).
97. See Ely, supra note 2; Green, supra note 8.
98. Quoted in PAUL HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE: LAW, RELIGION, AND THE CONSTITUTION
104 n.154 (2011).
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feel similarly about Erie: I believe in it because I’ve seen it done. Erie is
so integral to the way we think and write and teach about the law in the
modern era that it’s hard to imagine the legal landscape without it. Erie
may not be either good or bad but simply inevitable in our current legal
age. It’s a way of life.
All the same, the world turns and paradigms shift. If we find Erie’s
way of life attractive—and I’ve suggested we should—then we need to
care for it. I’ve tried to suggest some ways in which Erie’s worldview is
under threat from quarters that may seem awfully remote from the
question whether a federal court sitting in diversity must apply state law
to a railroad accident on a dark night in Pennsylvania. But the fact that we
sit here talking about Erie 80 years after it came down suggests that its
principles are more resilient than one might think.

